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1. Introduction 
 
Modern agricultural marketing systems are often highly complex structures with a range of 
inter-linking players operating within diverse trading environments.  To compare the 
effectiveness of one agricultural marketing system against another is no easy task.  It is 
typically attempted by assessing which system has the greatest effect on farm level prices, or 
at best the aggregate economic benefits to the economy as a whole1.  In such analyses it is 
normally reasoned that competitive marketing systems provide the norm against which 
existing systems are compared, because it is further assumed that market solutions are 
welfare maximising2.  Such reasoning is the basis of the Structure, Conduct and Performance 
paradigm that has been widely used in industrial organisation studies and has often been used 
as the basis for recommending change to marketing systems or for industry legislation3.   
 
While this approach may be useful for analysing situations where there are high levels of 
intervention, it may be limiting where interventions are more subtle or where there may be 
considerable differences in the industry structures.  The UK and New Zealand dairy 
marketing structures are analysed in this paper as an illustration of such a problem.   
 
Both have markedly different industry structures involving quite different institutional forms.  
The New Zealand dairy sector is co-operatively owned and operates largely free from 
Government intervention, but under the statutory export control of the farmer owned New 
Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB).  The UK dairy industry was de-regulated in 1994 with the 
disbanding of its statutory buyer and seller of raw milk, the Milk Marketing Board (MMB).  
However, the UK industry still operates within the confines of the European Union Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
 
Furthermore, the New Zealand industry is heavily export orientated with around 95% of milk 
production going to international markets.  The UK on the other hand, is dominated by 
domestic fresh pasteurised liquid milk processing, which accounts for around 50% of all UK 
milk supply.  New Zealand ‘dries off’ most cows over winter months, whereas in the UK, 
milk is produced all year round.  These differences are probably a result of history and the 
trade focus of the two industries, but make it difficult to evaluate possible relationships 
between structure and performance. 
 
Both industries are considered to have low levels of intervention and both would claim to be 
efficient: New Zealand through the extent of its vertical integration and unified approach to 
international markets; the UK through the disbanding of its statutory marketing board and its 
competitive market based structure.  The  remaining level of intervention has still been a 
source of discussion within each country and in international comparisons.  These 
comparisons are made extremely difficult because of the complexities of the policies and 
structures, and the varying level of trade dependence4. 
 
1 For example Martin S K and Zwart A C “ Marketing Agencies and the Economics of Market Segmentation” 
Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics.  31(3) 1987. 
2 See for example discussion in Carter C  A, McCalla A F and Sharples J A “ Imperfect Competition and 
political economy” Westview Press 1990. 
3 ACIL “ Agricultural Marketing Regulation:  Reality vs Doctrine” A report prepared for the New Zealand 
Business Roundtable, 1992. 
4 The differences and complexities in some of the world dairy industries are outlined in: OECD, “ Reforming 
Dairy Policy”, Paris, 1996. 
 2
An alternative approach to measuring performance is proposed in this paper.  The objective is 
to measure how such different and complex marketing systems respond to a range of different 
economic stimuli, by assuming there are a basic set of behavioural norms that we might 
expect to see in an efficient industry.  Comparing these responses and explaining why they 
occur may shed greater light on the relative strengths and weaknesses, and thus performance 
of each system.  This approach is a basic application of workable competition analysis, in 
that rather than focusing on the structure of the different marketing systems, the conduct or 
behaviour of the industry is studied to derive implications about the performance. 
 
 
2.   Expected Industry Response 
 
After outlining the complex structure of the two marketing systems, each is analysed through 
their response to a series of economic and stimuli and marketing situations, in an attempt to 
compare respective behaviour. 
 
In each case it is expected that an efficient or appropriately performing industry would 
respond in a particular manner.  The stimuli and expected responses are described in more 
detail below.  The responses are defined in terms of the manner in which dairy farmers and 
processing firms are expected to respond to changes in the marketing environment, or to 
capture the benefits of normal marketing activity. 
 
The suggested responses outlined above could be argued, but they are presented in an attempt 
to identify responses that might reasonably be expected, from both an economic and 
marketing perspective, to occur in an industry that is efficient and responsive to marketing 
opportunities.  In order to understand how the respective industries might respond it is 
necessary to understand in some detail,  the price setting and contractual arrangements that 
are important to the industries.  In the approach taken here these are seen to be more 
important than the political or industrial structure as they define the manner in which market 
information and pricing signals are relayed between the key decision makers in the industry. 
 
The structure of the New Zealand and UK dairy industries are examined below and the 
following sections describe how the different industries might respond and react to the 
different market circumstances. 
 
 3
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Expected Market Response - Behavioural Norms 
 
 
Market 
Stimulus 
Example 
Situation 
Expected 
Processor Response 
Expected Farm 
Level Response 
 
Demand 
shifts 
A short- medium term  
increase in the demand for 
dairy products in the 
world market, e.g. 
emerging new market 
Prices and production  
should increase.  Price  
increases should be  
passed on to producers 
 
Prices should increase and 
output respond to meet the  
market opportunities. 
Supply shifts A short- medium term 
increase in production in 
the industry concerned, 
e.g. fall in competing 
output price 
Increased throughput 
results in changed  
output of all products  
and marketed with  
minimal price fall or  
stock accumulation. 
Increased supply marketed 
without stock build up.   
Expect prices to fall and  
supply to adjust 
accordingly 
 
Specific 
price change 
An increase in the return  
for one of the specific  
products, e.g. an increases 
in the demand/price for  
Cheese 
Product mix would  
change and prices to  
producers should  
reflect any increase in  
aggregate demand 
Prices and production  
should respond to the 
extent  
that aggregate returns  
change 
 
Product 
development 
The extent to which the  
industry is able to invest  
in and respond to  
opportunities to develop  
new products  
There should be  
incentives for  
individual firms to  
invest in and capture  
the benefits from such  
activity 
Producers should be able to 
supply firms or  
organisations that make  
suitable investments in such 
activity.  Farmers should  
influence industry level  
investments 
Value 
adding 
The extent to which the  
industry identifies and  
responds to opportunities  
to develop products to  
consumer requirements 
There should be 
incentives for  
individual firms to  
identify and capture  
benefits from adding  
value 
Producers should be able to 
supply firms that make  
suitable investments in such 
activity.  Farmers should  
influence industry level  
investments 
Industry 
promotion 
The level of generic and  
product based promotion  
across the industry 
Firms should have  
opportunities to  
develop brand  
promotion, and be  
supportive of generic   
promotion 
Producers should have a  
choice of brands to support  
and should be able to  
evaluate and control the  
level of generic promotion 
 
 
 
3.   The New Zealand Dairy Market 
 
New Zealand currently produces 11,121 thousand tonnes of milk, around  95% of  which is 
exported5.  This is almost all sold through the NZDB which has full control over the 
exporting of dairy products.   
 
 
 
e.g.:  Europe 
(butter) 
e.g.:  Asia 
(ingredients) 
 
  
 4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
An Overview of the New Zealand Dairy Industry Structure 
 
 
                                                          
5 MAF, (1997), Sonza - Situation and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture, Wellington. 
e.g.:  Europe 
(milk powder) 
e.g.:  Asia 
(consumer 
products) 
International 
Product Markets 
 
NZDB 
 
Dairy Processing Co-operatives
 
Dairy Farmer Payout 
Standard 
Cost 
Models 
Incentives 
Processor 
Margin 
NZDB Basic
Price 
Butter Cheese 
=  Payment Flow 
=  Information Flow 
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Figure 1 simply illustrates the major players in the New Zealand dairy industry and how they 
inter-relate.  The NZDB is owned by the co-operative processing companies, themselves 
farmer owned.  It is charged with finding export markets for dairy output.  The industry is 
free from institutional support, other than the Government’s sanctioning of the NZDB to act 
as the statutory single seller of New Zealand dairy exports.  Although the NZDB can, and 
does, grant export licenses to allow other companies to export direct, this is relatively small 
scale.  Unlike the UK, only 5% of milk production is sold domestically.  The domestic 
market is free and competitive, with virtually no link to the NZDB export system.   
 
However, the pricing mechanisms used by NZDB in exporting 95% of milk supplies 
dominate the market.  After extensive market analysis, the NZDB negotiates with dairy 
processing co-operatives to acquire the range of products to match its market forecasts.  The 
NZDB pays processors for product supplies mainly on the basis of the ‘standard cost 
models’, with some additional ‘incentives’.  The anticipated NZDB ‘basic price’ is known to 
farmers as the base price they are likely to receive over the season.  Processing companies 
pay this to back to farmer members as they receive it from the NZDB.  In addition, the 
processing companies attempt to pay any additional processing profits wherever possible on 
top of the NZDB base price, at the year-end. 
 
The cost models are engineering representations of what is required to make a dairy product 
in a well designed, efficient factory of a given size.  There is a separate cost model for almost 
all dairy products produced.  There are four basic pricing elements to the cost models: milk 
value, manufacturing costs, milk collection costs and administration. 
 
The value of milk plays a key role in the models.  The NZDB place a value on the milk by 
examining returns from all product sales to overseas markets over previous seasons and 
expected market returns for the coming season.  These valuations for milk constituents, fat 
and protein, are then used in all of the different product standard cost model calculations.  
Thus, the processing co-operatives receive the same ‘pooled’ value for the milk they process, 
whatever the product - effectively making them indifferent to product mix (as far as the milk 
value element of the cost model is concerned, at least.) 
 
The cost models also make additional payments relating to manufacturing costs, milk 
collection costs and administration costs of building and running the ‘standard’ plant. 
 
The principals behind the cost models are to distribute the industry profit through the base 
price pool at the same rate for each product type and to reimburse manufacturers their costs, 
not to give them a profit margin.  In reality however, a profit margin is available for an 
efficient plant and this puts a powerful driver in the industry to improve efficiency over, or 
‘beat’, the cost model.   
 
On top of the standard cost model basic price, the Dairy Board can pay incentives to 
companies direct, to encourage supplies of certain products or types of products to match 
market demand.  The NZDB try to ensure that 80% of production is contracted to processors 
at the start of the season.  20% is left as slack in the system to provide cover for climatic 
variations etc.  On this 20% (only), the NZDB may pay an additional price incentive - a 
differential - for certain product categories.  Any differential is then applied to all products 
within that category.  If the NZDB wanted a specific product from a specific site, they could 
negotiate direct with that company alone, by paying a ‘diversion’.  However, paying by this 
mechanism is expensive and creates financial imbalances between companies. 
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Once production is in the correct product categories, the NZDB has to ensure that suitable 
proportions of products are made to suitable market specifications.  To achieve this, 
‘incentives’ are used.  Products not of a standard specification may attract an incentive, 
which works on a matrix scoring system.  The total points awarded are then multiplied by a 
fixed NZ$ rate to give the final incentive payment.   
 
The NZDB base price is paid to processors monthly, although the NZDB are unlikely to be 
receiving payment for their products so regularly.  On top of these payments from the NZDB, 
processing co-operatives may add year-end bonus payments.  The level of such pay-out 
depends upon several factors.  It may be the result of some efficiency gain over the cost 
model - low transport costs, or a low debt level; it may reflect a higher return obtained from 
the local market; or may reflect profits form non-dairy activities. 
 
In summary, New Zealand processing co-operatives are competitive and have a strong 
emphasis on production efficiency.  The NZDB is the main focus for marketing the products 
overseas and thus play a major role in the transmission of price signals to the processing 
firms.  The discussion above has highlighted the role that the costing model plays, in 
attempting to treat all of the firms in an equitable manner, and yet ensuring that production is 
responsive to changing demands. 
 
 
4.   The UK Dairy Market 
 
The UK has around 37,000 milk producers.  The average herd size is nearly 70 cows, which 
compares to a New Zealand average of 199.  Around 80% of UK milk comes from England 
& Wales and as such, the English & Welsh dairy sector will be referred to here to as the UK.  
The UK milk market was de-regulated in November 1994 after 60 years of statutory 
monopoly.  The old Milk Marketing Board (MMB)6, was the statutory buyer and seller of all 
milk produced.  Its abolition allowed farmers to sell milk direct to any buyer.   
 
Figure 2 shows the main players in the UK dairy sector and the relationships between them.  
It can be seen that farmers sell milk in one of three ways: about 5% of milk is sold through 
local farmer owned ‘milk groups’ who typically negotiate supply deals with processors based 
on the volume of milk they can provide; about 35% of milk is sold direct to processing 
companies by individual farmers; and around 60% of milk is sold to Milk Marque, a national 
farmer owned co-operative7.  Milk Marque emerged in England & Wales as a voluntary 
successor to the MMB.  It does not currently process milk, but purchases milk from farmer 
members and sells on to the process sector. 
 
Whilst the UK industry has been ‘de-regulated’, it still operates within the confines of the 
CAP dairy regime.  This works through a system of production quotas, intervention buying 
for skimmed milk powder (SMP) and butter and export subsidies/import tariffs. 
 
As in New Zealand, milk in the UK is purchased from farmers on dairy company supply 
contracts. In the UK, milk is paid for according to the constituents (fat and protein) within the 
milk, adjusted for hygienic quality, volume, transport and season8.  In New Zealand, milk is  
6 In fact there were five boards, one in England in Wales, three in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland. 
7 For an explanation of this split, see Bates, S.A.E., and Pattisson, N., (1997), “UK milk prices and farmers” 
attitudes towards them since market de-regulation”, British Food Journal, 99/2, pp.50-56. 
8 For a more detailed discussion of farm gate milk prices in the UK, see Bates, S.A.E., (1996), “Factors 
affecting UK milk prices since market de-regulation”, Farm Management Journal, Vol. 9, No.6, pp.277-286. 
also paid for on the level of fat and protein in the milk, but is paid as kilograms of milk solids 
rather than per litre as in the UK.  New Zealand  typically does not have seasonal price 
adjustments. 
 
Again in contrast to New Zealand, most traditional ‘year-end’ bonuses in the UK are spread 
across the year.  Spreading the bonus across monthly payments would improve the perception 
of that company’s milk price relative to others in the intensely competitive UK market.  A 
company paying a conservative price through the year plus a large year-end bonus, as 
happens in New Zealand, in the UK would appear to be paying a relatively low price on a 
month by month price comparison. 
 
 
 
Scottish Milk 
1,150ml 
(8%) 
E&W Farmers 
11,200ml 
(82%) 
United Dairy 
Farmers (NI) 
1,300ml 
(9%) 
Quota Holding
Farmer Groups
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Processors 
Spot 
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 Export? 
 Special 
   Contract? 
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(34% of E&W) 
Residual 
Fluctuating 
Ex-Farm 
Premier 
=  Milk Flow 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
An Overview of the UK Dairy Industry Structure 
 
 
In the UK, the price Milk Marque pays to its farmer members is seen by many as a 
benchmark.  Processing companies typically have paid higher prices than Milk Marque in 
order to attract direct milk supplies.  In some cases, these have been targeted at larger farms 
closer to factory sites.  As such, many farmers face a choice of supply contract, usually at 
least a choice between Milk Marque and a local dairy or milk group. 
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Unlike New Zealand, the UK processing sector is largely non co-operative, with some of the 
largest UK players - Northern Foods, Unigate, Dairy Crest and Robert Wiseman Dairies - 
being limited companies, listed on the London stock exchange.  However, as a result of the 
size of Milk Marque, almost all UK processors, despite their direct farm supplies, have to buy 
some of their raw milk requirement from Milk Marque, as is illustrated in Figure 2.   
 
Milk Marque sell milk to the processing sector through a six monthly bidding process.  Milk 
Marque offers its milk for sale on a range of contract types at different prices.  Companies 
then place sealed and binding bids for volumes of milk required on each of the contracts at 
the prices initially set by Milk Marque.  If there is an over demand, prices rise and bidding 
begins again.  If there is an underbid, prices fall and bidding begins again.  In theory, this is 
repeated until a market balance of supply and demand is achieved. 
 
In summary, the UK market system is considerably different from New Zealand.  This is 
more than just that the UK is focused on the domestic market whilst New Zealand is export 
orientated.  UK processors are less co-operative, many being private companies.  However, 
even within this system, there is still debate over the market power of Milk Marque, the 
private companies and the constrains of the quota system.  It appears that the selling system 
operated by the central co-operative, and  the diverse contracts offered by the private firms 
play a major role in affecting how the individual firms respond to the market conditions.   
 
 
5.   Market Stimuli 
 
As a means of trying to making to sense of these complex marketing systems, each is 
subjected to the following market stimuli in an attempt to explore the likely market response, 
the appropriateness of the signals transmitted and thus the overall suitability of each market 
structure.   
 
5.1   An Unexpected Increase in Aggregate Demand 
 
The New Zealand market system should be able to cope adequately with an unexpected 
increase in aggregate demand.  The NZDB would pick up market changes through its market 
analysis.  It would then be able to adopt an appropriate industry response through its buying 
mechanism from the processing co-operatives 
 
The 20% of New Zealand production which the NZDB does not buy on ‘committed’ contract 
could be used to meet the increased demand in the short term, but this might be limited by the 
availability of producers to  the short term.  The NZDB may also release any stocks it had 
onto the market to meet the demand.  Volumes of product planned by the NZDB could be 
increased for the next season.  A limit to the effectiveness of the New Zealand market 
response might be the NZDB’s statutory requirement to purchase all of the dairy products 
produced.  The co-operative processors also have limited power to control their raw milk 
supplies.  Whilst most processors do now require a capital contribution from new co-
operative members the capital contribution is likely to bring a corresponding fall in land 
prices.  The co-operatives could ultimately refuse additional membership, however, they do 
have to accept all supplies from existing members.   
 
At farm level, any gains obtained by the NZDB would ultimately pass back to New Zealand 
dairy farmers through the co-operative processing companies.  The weakness here is that 
farmers receive a ‘bundled’ price, which may include profits from other non-dairy related  
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activities9.  If for example, there was an unexpected drop in aggregate demand, profit from 
non-dairy activities undertaken by the NZDB or processing companies, might sustain farm 
incomes, potentially blurring the market signal to the farmer. 
 
The response from the UK market system is arguably clearer due primarily to the existence of 
production quotas.  An unexpected increase in aggregate demand would therefore be met by 
increased prices from a processing sector dealing direct with the market.  Those processors 
may then use higher market returns to source more of their milk requirement direct from 
farmers - having to pay them a higher price to do so, in a market where competition for a 
fixed milk supply is intense.   
 
Alternatively the companies, many of whom are non co-operative, may attempt to retain the 
higher returns.  However, as a result of the increase in product prices, Milk Marque would 
attempt to extract a higher price for their raw milk sold to the processing sector.  If successful, 
Milk Marque, as a farmer owned supply co-operative, would pay any increased return to 
farmer members. If Milk Marque increased their farm gate milk price, other companies would 
likely follow - to maintain their premium over the Milk Marque price in order to retain 
farmers.   
 
Thus, all UK farmers would benefit, including those who do not sell directly to Milk Marque.  
The question arising from the UK model is whether increasing prices for a fixed supply is an 
optimum market response.  Thus, although its market response may be clearer, the UK 
market mechanism does not have the flexibility of response that the New Zealand sector 
does. 
 
In addition, in the short run,the Milk Marque selling system,which occurs every six months10, 
may enable UK processors to adjust their production quicker than in New Zealand, where the 
NZDB would re-negotiate its contracted ‘commitment’ product volumes each season.   
 
5.2  An Unexpected Increase in Aggregate Supply 
 
In New Zealand, most plants are designed to cope with peak milk supplies and thus rarely run 
at full capacity.  The aggregate industry should be able to process an unexpected increase in 
supply.  The NZDB, as seller for almost all exports, has some influence over how any 
increased supply would be processed and works closely to ensure the range of products made 
match market demand.  The NZDB has a broad international network and much experience 
of selling on world markets, assisted by New Zealand’s competitive advantage in low cost 
milk production.  Thus at processor level, the New Zealand market ought to be able to handle 
and unexpected increase in aggregate supply.  Whilst the NZDB may find markets for the 
increased supply, not all the markets would provide a similar return.  Thus, an appropriate 
signal would be sent to farmers because a significant increase in aggregate supply would 
dilute the NZDB market return (assuming it was not offset by any gains from non-dairy 
interests) and thus the payout to farmers. 
 
The UK market would face a problem from this market shock, again because of the quota 
system operated under the CAP dairy regime.  Over the year, the market mechanism does not 
allow for any increase in aggregate milk supply.  The range of penalties applied if the 
country/ firm/ farmer do exceed quota, blur any aggregate market response.  That said, there 
may be  
9 See Hussey, D., (1992), Agricultural Marketing Regulation - Reality Versus Doctrine, Report for the New 
Zealand Business Round Table, ACIL. 
10 Companies can buy milk from Milk Marque on 6, 12 or 18 month contracts.  Clearly those processors buying 
on 18 month contracts would not have this flexibility advantage. 
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cases where the industry faces short term increases in aggregate supply, such as the result of 
unexpected weather conditions.  Although most companies milk supply contract includes 
some seasonal price adjustment in an attempt to level out seasonal supply peaks and troughs, 
if an unexpected increase in supply did occur, some processors may struggle to cope.  This 
may be particularly so for UK processors of packaging liquid, who could reduce their price, 
but the aggregate industry, faced with a near flat consumer demand profile for this highly 
perishable product, would typically process (or sold on to be processed) this excess milk into 
commodity products such as butter and skimmed milk powder.  Returns on these products are 
usually low for UK manufacturers, who struggle to compete on world markets without 
subsidy.  Such returns would dilute company profits in the short term.  However this could 
only ever be a short term phenomenon because of milk quotas which fix UK milk production 
at around only 90% self sufficiency. 
 
Having looked at possible responses to broad aggregate demand and supply shifts in each 
market, responses to the following, more subtle, stimuli are examined in an attempt to see 
through the complexity of the marketing systems and the interactions within them. 
 
5.3 An Increase in Demand for a Specific Product Category, Cheese 
 
The NZDB would again pick up any increase in market demand for cheese through its market 
analysis.  If the demand increase was short term, some of the 20% NZDB flexible supply 
might be directed towards cheese production through the incentive system.  However, a 
difficulty with the cost model system might arise if the increase in demand for cheese was 
sustained.  The milk value component of the cost model is a pooled price of all the NZDB 
market returns.  As a simple example, a company supplying cheese would receive the same 
equivalent milk price as a company who were producing butter, even though world butter 
demand might have dropped as cheese demand grew.  This may cause sub-optimal 
investment decisions by processors who may therefore continue to invest further in butter 
processing facilities.  If this persisted, the NZDB might be left increasingly reliant on the 
incentive system, which is costly and also, by its very nature, rewards some processing 
companies more than others.  At farm level, farmers again receive a pooled price.  Farmers 
supplying the butter processor would benefit as much as those supplying the cheese processor 
and thus would receive no signal to reduce milk production or switch supplier. 
 
In the UK, the market response would again be clearer.  As in the response to an aggregate 
demand increase, UK processors dealing direct with the market, would switch production.  
Those manufacturers producing cheese would, all things being equal, divert more resources 
into cheese production and increase cheese output.  Some firms producing butter would 
switch to producing cheese.  If a butter manufacturer did not switch to cheese, in the short 
run, they would receive relatively lower returns.  A resultant relatively lower price to farmers 
may produce a signal for farmers to switch company.  However, the switch from butter into 
cheese should ultimately lead to a higher butter price from the falling butter supply.  Thus, 
the market would readjust with more cheese having been produced. 
 
5.4  New Product Developments 
 
At a broad level, the New Zealand dairy industry has a good track record of innovation.  This 
can be seen through the recent launches of spreadable butter in Europe and the development 
of the ‘Analene’ calcium enriched milk powder brand for the SE Asian market.  In the case of 
new product developments like spreadable butter, the industry developed the product and 
therefore the NZDB is responsible for selling it overseas under their ‘Anchor’ brand.  
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 However, spreadable butter is not available on the domestic New Zealand market yet 
because of debates as to who actually owns the brand.  As the product was developed through 
the NZDB, which deals purely with exports, it is unclear which of the competing co-
operative companies owns the rights to sell the product on the potentially lucrative domestic 
market.  Questions over ownership may lead to less than optimal rates of adoption.   
 
In addition, some processing co-operatives undertake their own new product development as 
well as wider joint industry initiatives.  For example, Kiwi Dairies, New Zealand’s second 
largest, has its own private research subsidiary company, KiwiTech, as well as a group within 
Kiwi Dairies working on joint industry initiatives.  This reflects questions about reward from 
the current system.  To develop a collective new product benefits the industry.  Obtaining a 
company patent would benefit that company’s farmer members.  Thus in terms of new 
product development, the current system in New Zealand does work reasonably well, but 
there are ‘grey’ areas within it, particularly regarding ownership and reward. 
 
In the UK, a de-regulated market should enhance new product developments by specific 
companies dealing direct with the market.  However, the UK has not been strong in this area.  
This is partly a hangover from the previous system of agreed pricing where companies 
received guaranteed returns.  Under the old ‘end-use pricing’ system, companies bought milk 
on a hierarchy of agreed prices from the MMB, dependent on the end use the milk was going 
to11.  Those who paid the lowest price for milk under that system have seen the largest 
increase in raw material price since de-regulation - now that all companies compete at ‘one’ 
price for milk supplies.  Coupled with fairly static retail prices, this has put intense pressure 
on some processing company margins.  The dairy companies have also argued that Milk 
Marque’s presence in the market has prevented them earning enough of a return to invest in 
the industry.  Milk Marque however, has argued the companies are simply inefficient after 
sixty years of agreed pricing.  Such discussions raise another problem for the UK industry, 
that of uncertainty.  With prolonged political machinations over the new market structure, 
uncertainty may also be restricting investment.  However, these concerns should ease as the 
market mechanism settles down.  The weaker role of co-operatives in UK processing mean 
farmer signals from company new product developments are likely to vary and will not 
necessarily be passed on.  Milk Marque does have a small technical research group, but are 
not currently involved in milk processing. 
 
5.5  Opportunities to Add Value 
 
Again, the New Zealand industry does add value, but the issue is complicated by some weak 
market signals and some ‘grey’ areas of debate.  The NZDB’s current policy is to sell more 
of its products into value added markets.  Whilst the NZDB is trying to be market led, the 
wider industry is production driven.  Processors do add value, for example, by sending 
representatives into the market to service their customers and to tailor production.  However, 
they do not get substantially more money for doing so under the payment mechanism which 
is cost, rather than value, driven.  The processing companies may attract some additional 
incentive payments, but these are relatively small.  As a result, they are more reliant on the 
NZDB correctly translating the market signals to them.   
 
Whilst the industry is trying to address this issue, potentially a longer term concern is that of 
capital.  Currently, NZDB growth and investment (in New Zealand, at least) are funded out 
of  
11 For a more detailed discussion of the UK market in the run up to de-regulation, see Fearne, A.  and Ray, D., 
(1996), “Price determination and discovery in a de-regulated milk market: perspectives on the price of milk”, 
Food Policy, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp.171-189. 
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retained farmer earnings.  Some within the industry argue the NZDB, with its substantial 
asset base, is well able to fund a greater emphasis on value added.  Others disagree, citing the 
large levels of capital required to build brands which frequently do not provide returns for 
several years.  The failure rate of new brands may also expose farmers to a greater degree of 
risk.  The complexities of separating out value added benefits in a co-operative, yet 
competing industry, are illustrated by the way the industry has evolved its brand ownership.  
Whilst in practise this system works, the largest co-op, NZDG, established the ‘Anchor’ 
name and owns that brand domestically.  However overseas, ‘Anchor’ is owned by the 
NZDB (bought from the NZDG).  Thus, any New Zealand processor could be contracted by 
the NZDB to processor ‘Anchor’ products for overseas markets, but only NZDG can use the 
‘Anchor’ brand in the domestic market.  At farm level, the co-operative structure means that 
farmers do benefit from higher market returns.  However, the ‘bundled’ milk price may blur 
that signal to an extent.  If higher farmer returns come from the NZDB’s success in adding 
more market value to existing milk supplies, the only way a farmer can participate more in 
the industry is by increasing milk production. 
 
Much UK milk production is sold domestically, unlike New Zealand.  The much larger, more 
developed UK consumer market provides opportunities to build relations with retailers 
through concepts such as category management and offers some UK processors opportunities 
to add value.  Equally, at farm level, most farmers face a choice of milk supply contract.  
Non-Milk Marque contracts may pay for milk in a variety of ways, often dependent upon the 
product mix of the dairy processing company.  It is not uncommon for the same company to 
pay different milk prices for milk going to different factory sites. In addition, the de-regulated 
environment has enabled farmers to add value through production techniques.  This may 
become more significant in the wake of the UK BSE crisis.  UK retailer Marks & Spencer, 
for example, have a contract with Unigate through which they sell liquid milk from ‘specially 
selected farms’ who adhere to strict production and animal welfare codes. 
 
5.6  Aggregate Industry Promotion 
 
The New Zealand industry would appear to react well to opportunities to promote its 
industry.  Whilst there is intense competition between co-operatives the New Zealand market 
system is integrated in that farmers own the processing co-operatives, who in turn own the 
NZDB.  The NZDB, selling almost all New Zealand exports, promotes aggregate New 
Zealand products.  Farmer retained earnings fund the NZDB and all such international 
marketing and promotional activities.  In addition the NZDB funds support services such as 
the Livestock Improvement Agency (LIA) and the Dairy Research Institute (DRI).  Although 
there is no current generic milk promotion domestically, the strong role of company brands in 
the domestic liquid milk mean that individual companies undertake their own promotion. 
 
The UK market response to such a need is relatively weak. Generic industry promotion ended 
with de-regulation.  Many of the functions of the old MMB, such as statistics gathering, have 
either been privatised, or in the case of statistic gathering, were restructured and incorporated 
into another body.  Companies do promote their own consumer brands, but the power of the 
multiple retailers means strong UK dairy company brands are limited, not least because 
liquid milk is predominantly sold as ‘own-label’ supermarket milk.  The uncertainty and the 
lack of profitability in the industry outlined above also have limited promotional activity. 
Farmers are levied to fund the Milk Development Council(MDC)which funds wider research 
projects into the dairy sector.  Milk Marque is also actively promoting itself and has 
developed its own brand logo.  However in the UK, and also in New Zealand to some extent, 
an element of promotion within the industry is linked to political posturing. 
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6.   Results and Conclusions 
 
The two industries described have very different structures  and contractual arrangements and 
the  detailed discussion has attempted to describe how the firms and organisations might react 
to changing market circumstances.  The discussion presented  above is summarised in the 
following table.  In each case, the authors have attempted to identify the extent of the 
response from both the processing and producing firms in each country, and these are loosely 
ranked, with a score of Y+ representing the most appropriate response, and ?? suggesting that 
there is an uncertain or inappropriate response.  The comments identify some of the 
significant differences between the industries and why these differences occur. 
 
This paper attempts to provide a simple and interesting approach to comparing highly 
complex marketing structures.  The results of the practical illustration shown in Table 2 
suggest that whilst both the UK and New Zealand market mechanisms respond favourably to 
market conditions they have some weaknesses.  There are some distinct differences in the 
manner in which both markets respond to circumstances such as relative shifts in product 
prices, and generic promotional opportunities. 
 
At aggregate level, both market mechanisms perform reasonably well, despite their very 
different structures and given the UK quota system under the CAP.  Yet, when one examines 
deeper, more subtle changes, weaknesses in the complex market structures are highlighted.  
The key relative weaknesses in the UK system would appear to be with regard to industry 
promotion and in developing new products , and there may even be a correlation between the 
two.  The main relative weaknesses in the New Zealand system appear to lie in signals to add 
value and signals relating to specific product demand 
 
While the specific judgements may be argued, it would appear that a careful analysis of the 
price setting mechanisms and contractual arrangements between the key players in the 
industry has provided some insights into the behaviour of the industries.  These 
characteristics are normally associated with high performing industries, and provide a 
common basis for comparing performance. 
 
Although this approach is subjective, what is perhaps of greater significance is that by 
evaluating likely market responses to a series of economic shocks, a more detailed and 
explanatory means of comparison is possible.  This highlights the relative position of the 
marketing systems and also the individual strengths and weaknesses within each.  It is likely 
that such a method would provide a more useful mechanism for comparing even more 
divergent industry structures where there are more significant government policies and 
market interventions, and conventional comparisons of industry structures or performance are 
not possible 
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Table 2 
The Appropriateness of Market Signals in Each System 
 
Market 
Shock 
Industry 
Player 
New  
Zealand 
The  
UK 
Summary of 
Main Difference 
  Appropriate Signal 
& Response? 
Appropriate Signal 
& Response? 
 
Aggregate 
demand 
shift 
Processor 
 
Farmer 
YY  
 
Y? 
Y+ 
 
YY 
NZ unable to control supply; 
farmer receives ‘bundled’  
price. 
Aggregate 
supply shift 
Processor 
 
Farmer 
YY  
 
YY 
?Y 
 
?? 
UK restricted by production  
quota. 
Increase 
in product  
demand 
Processor 
 
Farmer 
?? 
 
?? 
YY 
 
YY 
NZ pooled prices to 
companies and farmers. 
New 
product  
developmen
t 
Processor 
 
Farmer 
Y? 
 
Y? 
?? 
 
?? 
NZ OK, but blurring of  
ownership and incentive.  UK  
blurred by market  
uncertainty, squeezing of  
processors; and inefficiencies  
from previous system. 
Adding 
value 
 
Processor 
 
Farmer 
?? 
 
?? 
Y? 
 
Y? 
NZ  blurred by lack of  
processor incentive and  
pooled farm price.  Capital  
issue potentially a concern?  
UK better, particularly at  
farm level where milk supply  
contracts can be factory  
specific.  Processors deal  
direct with market - but 
 opportunities partly because  
UK sells mainly to domestic  
market, unlike NZ. 
Aggregate 
promotion 
Processor 
 
Farmer 
YY 
 
YY 
?? 
 
?? 
NZ integrated industry - 
funding of LIA, DRC etc.;  
UK weak generic promotion  
post de-regulation.  Farmers  
do fund MDC.  UK should  
improve as uncertainty  
subsides and as sector  
profitability increases 
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